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Introduction 
Earnings management is a very complex and multifaceted phenomenon. It is defined 
in a variety of forms which reflect the fact that researchers often have very different 
perceptions of earnings management. For example, as Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
point out, practitioners and regulators often see earnings management as pervasive 
and problematic and in need of immediate remedial action. Schipper (1989) defines it 
in the context of purposeful intervention in external financial reporting, with the intent 
of obtaining some private gain.  
Therefore, the literature points to different debates on the topic of earnings man-
agement. Some studies simply focus on the theoretical aspect of earnings manage-
ment. These include Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000), García 
Osma et al. (2003), Yaping (2005), and Rath and Sun (2008), who focus on the main 
advances in earnings management research. Other researchers provide an empirical 
view. For example, some authors just aim to supply evidence of earnings manage-
ment; others assume that earnings management has been found in connection with 
many aspects of the company, such as its role in companies’ problems, financial mar-
kets, information asymmetry and agency theory.  
Others address the question of whether managers of firms in different countries 
engage in earnings management and, if so, how can its effects be measured and why 
do they do so, among other questions. As a consequence, an ongoing debate on the 
concept of earnings management is still present in the accounting and finance litera-
ture, indicating its continued importance.  
We contribute to the literature in two ways. The methodology used in this paper is 
based on a detailed review of the literature from early 1985 to 2013, and the devel-
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opment of a constructive classification of the results obtained by the authors. Taking 
into consideration the existing literature on earnings management, we created our 
database of the papers on earnings management. We have included in this database 
most cited articles published on earnings management in the journals of the account-
ing and finance literature. We have also incorporated PhD Theses, Master’s Theses 
and working papers on this topic. In total, we identified 207 articles, which included: 
journals, conferences, congresses and other publications, such as: PhD Theses, Mas-
ter’s theses and working papers. Such a broad analysis of papers from three perspec-
tives has never been done to my knowledge.  
The country analysis is a new perspective presented in our paper. The country of 
origin influences the perceptions and the results of earnings management investiga-
tions. So far, several studies have pointed out that the country of origin of the sample 
determines the results. See, for example, Leuz et al. (2003), Burgstahler et al. (2004), 
Geiger et al. (2006), Geiger et al. (2007); nevertheless, detailed analysis on country 
sample selection has not been available.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we describe the most 
common perception of earnings management by presenting prior definitions. We 
explain differences between authors and their implications on the perception of earn-
ings management.  
Second, taking into consideration the complex nature of earnings management and 
the abundance of literature, we look at the research on earnings management from 
three different perspectives. We begin by analysing the chronological perspective, 
making a roadmap of the evolution of earnings management. We point out and de-
termine significant moments in the phenomenon of earnings management. 
Then, the methodological perspective is investigated. Research studies are still 
concerned with the problem of measuring earnings management. In this section, we 
present the developments in this matter and new ways of detecting and measuring 
earnings management.  
Finally, we focus on the cross-country perspective. Looking at a wide range of 
countries of origin of the sample, we centre the attention on country selection by the 
authors. Finally, we present our conclusions.  
 
 
1. Definition of earnings management  
 
There has been no clear consensus on what earnings management is in the literature 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Messod, 2001). Practitioners and regulators defined earnings 
management in a variety of forms using a wide range of expressions to describe it. 
The definition of earnings management is also inconsistent in academic literature. 
Authors on earnings management contrast different aspects and characteristics of 
earnings management. Major problems with the definition include ambiguity and 
immeasurability. Some elements coincide and we may find them in the majority of 
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definitions; nevertheless, some of them are different. Therefore, to be able to support 
the systematic review of earnings management literature, we present our own defini-
tion of the concept:  
Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in financial reporting, designed 
to reach earnings targets by varying accounting practices. However, it is an action 
which takes place without necessarily violating accounting regulations, and which 
takes advantage of the possibilities of choice in accounting policy. The action may 
mislead stakeholders, causing them to make decisions on the basis of financial re-
ports that they would not have made otherwise.  
Our definition underlines the common elements found in many of the definitions. 
Elements such as: 
 the purposeful action of managers, indicating the deliberate and conscious activity 
of managers (following the definition of Schipper, 1989);  
 dealing with the external aspects of data, always regarding reporting data of firms 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999);  
 manipulation of the financial data of the company (GAAP definition);  
 reaching targets to obtain objectives and particular goals of managers (Park and 
Shin, 2004);  
 using the flexibility of choosing accounting treatments, the subjectivity of manag-
ers by selecting the norms which are helpful to achieve the planned results, and 
opting within the possibilities of standards (Fields et al., 2001); 
 the misleading nature of the information, as the presented information can pretend 
to hide or even fake some of information (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Nevertheless, other authors give different perceptions for some of the aspects of 
earnings management. A large number of studies, including our definition and our 
earnings management review, found that managers can exercise discretion through 
the choice of accounting methods or polices. However, other authors, for example 
Beneish (2001), Higson (2003), Rosner (2003), Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), Ji-
raporn et al. (2007), Chia et al. (2007), Hasnan et al. (2008), Kamel and Elbanna 
(2010), Perols and Lougee (2010), and Jones (2011), believe earnings management is 
not just a manipulation within the boundaries of accounting, but a form of financial 
reporting fraud.  
Other discussion points come from the different ways of managing earnings. It can 
be a manipulation of accruals with no direct cash flow consequences, hereafter re-
ferred to as accrual manipulation. Other authors talk about real earnings management 
where managers try to influence reported earnings through actions that substantially 
change the underlying cash flows thereby influencing reported earnings, for example 
Baber et al. (1991), Dechow and Sloan (1991), Bartov (1993), Bens et al. (2002), 
Graham et al. (2005), Zang (2005), Gunny (2005), and Roychowdhury (2006) among 
others. In light of the above issues, it is not too surprising that systematically identify-
ing earnings management is difficult. Our study aims to clarify these issues.  
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2. Methodology  
 
The researchers identified 207 articles from journals, conferences, congresses and 
other publications, such as PhD theses, Master’s theses and working papers. The re-
view period is from 1985 to March of 2013. Table 1 describes the details on the selec-
tion of the articles.  
 
Table 1. Database of journals and other reviewed literature  
 
Article Number  
of articles 
% of the 
total 
„Academy of Management Journal” 1 0.48% 
„Accounting and Business Research” 3 1.45% 
„Accounting Horizons” 2 0.48% 
„Accounting in Europe” 1 0.48% 
„Advanced in Accounting” 1 0.48% 
„Advances in International Accounting” 5 2.42% 
„Advanced in Scientific and Applied Accounting”  1 0.48% 
„American International Journal of Contemporary Research”  1 0.48% 
„Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica” 1 0.48% 
Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting 1 0.48% 
Annual EAA Congress 1 0.48% 
Blackwell Publishing 1 0.48% 
„Canadian Social Science” 1 0.48% 
„Contaduría y Administración” 1 0.48% 
„Contemporary Accounting Research” 1 0.48% 
„Critical Perspectives on Accounting” 1 0.48% 
„Economics and Society” 1 0.48% 
„Energy Economics” 1 0.48% 
Erasmus School of Economics 1 0.48% 
„European Accounting Review” 1 0.48% 
„European Scientific Journal” 1 0.48% 
„Expert Systems with Applications” 1 0.48% 
„Finance Research Letters 1 0.48% 
FUCAPE Científica 1 0.48% 
„Global Finance Journal” 2 0.97% 
„Global Review of Accounting and Finance” 1 0.48% 
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas 1 0.48% 
International Business Forum 1 0.48% 
„International Business Research” 1 0.48% 
„International Journal of Economics and Management” 1 0.48% 
„International Journal of Human and Social Sciences” 1 0.48% 
„International Review of Business Research Papers” 1 0.48% 
„International Review of Economics and Finance” 1 0.48% 
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Article Number  
of articles 
% of the 
total 
„International Review of Financial Analysis 3 1.45% 
„Investigaciones Económicas” 2 0.97% 
John Wiley & Sons 1 0.48% 
„Journal of Accounting and Economics” 31 14.97% 
„Journal of Accounting and Public Policy” 10 4.83% 
„Journal of Accounting Research” 7 3.38% 
„Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance” 1 0.48% 
„Journal of Banking & Finance” 4 1.93% 
„Journal of Business & Economics Research” 1 0.48% 
„Journal of Business Research” 2 0.97% 
„Journal of Corporate Finance” 5 2.42% 
„Journal of Economics and Management” 1 0.48% 
„Journal of Financial Economics” 9 4.35% 
„Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation” 4 1.93% 
„Journal of Multinational Financial Management” 1 0.48% 
„Jurnal Pengurusan” 1 0.48% 
LTA Academy 1 0.48% 
„Managerial Finance” 1 0.48% 
Master thesis 2 0.97% 
„Middle Eastern Finance and Economics” 1 0.48% 
Onderzoeksrapport  1 0.48% 
PhD Thesis 1 0.48% 
Prentice Hall 1 0.48% 
„Research in Accounting Regulation” 3 1.45% 
„Review of Accounting Studies” 2 0.97% 
„Revista de Contabilidad” 1 0.48% 
„Scandinavian Journal of Management” 1 0.48% 
„The Accounting Review” 6 2.90% 
„The British Accounting Review”  2 0.97% 
„The Cost and Management” 1 0.48% 
„The International Journal of Accounting” 14 6.76% 
„Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management” 1 0.48% 
Working papers* 43 20.77% 
Total 207 100,00% 
*  We include some of the working papers for the reason of the importance (in our opinion) of these 
articles in the investigation of the earnings management; see Bibliography.  
Source: the author. 
 
The breadth of the notion of earnings management leads us to consider different 
perspectives of the research on earnings management: 
1. Chronological perspective – this presents the most important studies in chronolog-
ical order, thus making clear the evolution of earnings management and determining 
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the most key milestones in understanding the phenomenon of earnings manage-
ment.  
2. Methodological perspective – this concentrates on the procedural and technical 
aspect of earnings management over many years of investigation. It focuses on the 
problem of measuring earnings management, and the development of new ways to 
detect and measure earnings management.  
3. Cross-country perspective – the evolution of interests on issue of earnings man-
agement from the point of view of the origin of the sample (the country of origin 
of the sample).  
 
 
3. Chronological perspective  
 
In this section we make a roadmap through many years of investigations on earnings 
management, showing the most important developments over the years. Table 2 
shows the chronological schedule of all 207 papers included in our study. However, 
describing all the papers is beyond the scope of our work. Within the over two hun-
dred papers we select those which in our estimation mark the key points in the under-
standing of earnings management. In Table 3 we present a summary of these papers.  
Healy (1985) was the first to introduce discretionary accruals to detect earnings 
management, incorporating the definition and parameters used in bonus agreements. 
His study examined managerial accounting decisions which postulate that executives 
rewarded by earnings-based bonuses select accounting procedures that increase their 
compensation. Healy’s test results suggest that accrual policies of managers are relat-
ed to the income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts and changes in account-
ing procedures by managers are associated with the adoption or modification of their 
bonus plan. It is this study that established earnings management as a line of investi-
gation for researchers.  
During the following years authors increasingly view the issue of earnings man-
agement through a focus on motivations for such activity. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) argue that managers in firms with earnings-based compensation agreements 
have the incentive to manipulate earnings to maximize their award by (always) select-
ing income increasing accounting policies. In the same year, DeAngelo (1986) hy-
pothesizes that managers of firms going private would have incentives to understate 
reported income in attempts to reduce the buyout compensation, but he failed to find 
support for this hypothesis.  
In 1988 DeAngelo discovers that managers by accounting discretion paint a more 
favourable picture of their own performance. The managers typically blame prior 
management for the previous poor operating performance. In the same year McNich-
ols and Wilson (1988) examine whether bad debts may be an incentives for earnings 
management. Their approach differs from previous earnings management studies in 
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that they consider a single accrual, the provision for bad debts, rather than a collection 
of accruals. McNichols and Wilson view manipulation of this provision as but one of 
several ways to manage earnings.  
Schipper (1989) is another study mostly cited by the authors. He shows the infor-
mation asymmetry between firm management and firm shareholders and its effect on 
manipulation. The environment surrounding earnings management represents a slip-
page between analytical models and empirical tests of earnings management.  
Perhaps one of the key studies on earnings management is the study of Jones (1991). 
She uses discretionary accruals as a measure for the scope of earnings management. It 
is a different, much more precise methodology, as the previous studies used total ac-
cruals as a proxy. She separates the total accruals on the discretionary part (managea-
ble) and non-discretionary (non-manageable) part of accruals. Her study tests whether 
firms that would benefit from import relief (for example, tariff increases and quota 
reductions) attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import 
relief. It is also a new insight into the development of earnings management literature, 
as prior studies typically examine situations in which all contracting parties have in-
centives to „perfectly” monitor (adjust) accounting numbers for such manipulation. 
Import relief investigations provide a specific motive for earnings management that is 
not provided in other earlier earnings management studies (Jones, 1991). Her results 
of empirical tests reports support the initial hypothesis suggesting that managers make 
income-decreasing accruals during import relief investigations.  
Subsequent studies base their methodology on that proposed by Jones (1991) with 
the authors following the investigation of incentives for earnings management. 
DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) find that highly leveraged troubled companies have 
large negative accruals related to the renegotiating of their debt contracts. Managers 
of troubled companies during a recession can improve their bargaining position with 
unions through income-decreasing accounting choices only when there is confirmato-
ry evidence of financial trouble and sacrifices by other stakeholders. Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) examine the abnormal accruals of a sample of 94 firms that report-
ed debt covenant violations in annual reports. This is in contrast with most studies, 
which support debt covenants relying on leverage as a proxy for the existence and 
tightness of accounting-based covenants. They demonstrate that in the year prior to 
violation, models indicate that violating firms have abnormal total and working capi-
tal accruals that are significantly positive.  
 
Table 2. Evolution of investigation of earnings management  
 
PANEL A: PAPERS BETWEEN 1985–1990 
Healy P. (1985)  
DeAngelo L. (1986) 
Watts R. and Zimmerman J. (1986) 
DeAngelo L. (1988) 
McNichols M. and Wilson P. (1988) 
Schipper K. (1989) 
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Table 2. Evolution of investigation of earnings management (cont.)  
 
PANEL B: PAPERS BETWEEN 1991–1995 
Jones J. (1991) 
Sundgren S. (1991) 
DeAngelo H., DeAngelo L. and Skinner 
D. (1992) 
Bartov E. (1993) 
DeFond M. and Jiambalvo J. (1994) 
Perry S. and Williams T. (1994) 
Kang S. and Sivaramakrishnan K. (1995) 
Paul K., Chaney C. and Lewis M. (1995) 
Dechow P., Sloan R. and Sweeney A. 
(1995) 
Holthausen R., Larcker D. and Sloan R. 
(1995) 
PANEL C: PAPERS BETWEEN 1996–2000 
Jiambalvo J. (1996)  
KasanenE., Kinnunen J. and Niskanen J. 
(1996) 
Dechow P., Sloan R. and Sweeney A., 
(1996) 
Guay W., Kothari S. and Watts R. (1996) 
Shivakumar L. (1996)  
Subramanyam K. (1996) 
Bernard V.L. and Skinner D.J. (1996) 
Burgstahler D. and Dichev I. (1997) 
Key K. (1997) 
Hunt A., Moyer S. and Shevlin T. (1997) 
Darrough M., Pourjalali H. and Saudagaran S. 
(1998) 
Rangan S. (1998)  
Teoh S., Wong I. and Wong T. (1998) 
Becker C., Defond M., Jiambalvo J. and 
Subramanyam J. (1998) 
Healy P.M. and Wahlen J.M. (1998) 
Konings J., Labro E. and Roodhooft F. 
(1998) 
Richardson V. (1998) 
Burgstahler D. and Eames M. (1998) 
DeFond M. and Subramanyam K. (1998) 
Healy P. (1999) 
Ball R., Kothari S. and Robin A., (1999) 
Kallunki J. and Martikainen M. (1999) 
Erickson M. and Wang S. (1999) 
Myers L. and Skinner D. (1999)  
Degeorge F., Patel J. and Zeckhauser R. 
(1999)  
Leone A., Guidry F. and Rock S., (1999)  
Guidry F., Leone A. and Rock S. (1999) 
Shivakumar L. and Jeter D. (1999) 
Kasznik R. (1999) 
Jeter D. and Shivakumar L. (1999) 
Peasnell K., Pope P. and Young S. (2000) 
McNichols M. (2000) 
Kinnunen J. et al. . (2000) 
Dechow P. and Skinner D. (2000) 
Ronen J. and Yaari V., (2000)  
Thomas J. and Zhang X. (2000) 
Petroni K., Ryan S. and Wahlen J. (2000)  
Jeanjean T. (2000) 
Bartov E. and Gul F. (2000) 
PANEL D: PAPERS BETWEEN 2001–2005 
D’Souza J., Jacob J. and Ramesh K. (2001) 
Xie H. (2001) 
Bartov E., Gul F. and Tsui J. (2001) 
Ebrahim A. (2001) 
Beneish D. (2001) 
Klein A. (2002) 
Bartov E., Givoly D. and Hayn C. (2002) 
Chung, R., Firth, M., and Kim, J. (2002) 
Yoon S. and Miller G. (2002a) 
Yoon S. and Miller G. (2002b) 
Zhang H. (2002) 
García Osma B., Gill de-Albornoz B. and 
Gisbert A. (2003) 
Wysocki P. (2003)  
Laux J. (2003) 
Xue Y. (2003)  
Henock L. (2004) 
ParkY., Shin and Hyun-Han (2004) 
Larcker D. and Richardson S. (2004) 
Park M. and Ro B. (2004) 
Lau H. (2004) 
Lee C. and Xue S. (2004) 
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Richardson S., Tuna I. and Wu M. (2002) 
Maijoor S. and Vanstraelen A. (2002) 
Otogawa K. (2002) 
Sun W. and Sun J. (2002) 
Xie B., Davidson W. and DaDalt P. 
(2003) 
Koh P. (2003) 
Das S. and Zhang H. (2003) 
Anandarajan A., Hasan I. and Lozano-
Vivas A. (2003) 
Roosenbooma P., Van der Gootb T. and 
Mertens G. (2003) 
Leuz C., Nanda D. and Wysocki P. 
(2003) 
Vander Bauwhede H. and Willekens M. 
(2003) 
Dechow P., Richardson S. and Tuna I. 
(2003) 
Johl S., Jubb C. and Houghton K. (2003) 
Guan L., Wright C. and Leikam S. (2005) 
Coppensa L. and Peek E. (2005) 
Gill-de-Albornoz B. and Illueca M. (2005) 
Van Tendeloo B. and Vanstraelen A. (2005) 
Lybaert N. et al. (2005) 
Zang A. (2005) 
Feres de Almeida J. et al. (2005) 
García Osma B. and Gill-de-Albornoz B. 
(2005) 
Kim J. and Yi C. (2005) 
Rahman U., Dowds J. and Cahan S. (2005) 
Martinez A. (2005) 
Markarian G. (2005) 
Yaping N. (2005) 
Jaggi B., Chin C. and Lin W. (2005) 
Saleh N., Iskandar T. and RahmatM. (2005) 
Kothari S., Leone A. and Wasley C. (2005) 
PANEL E: PAPERS BETWEEN 2006–2010 
Roychowdhury S. (2006) 
Bergstressera D. and Phililippon T. (2006) 
Petrovits C. (2006) 
Cormier D. and Martinez I. (2006) 
Geiger M. (2006) 
Burgstahler D., Hail L. and Leuz C. 
(2006) 
Lin K. (2006) 
Langa M., Smith Raedya J. and Wilson W. 
(2006)  
Ronen J., Tzur J. and Yaari V. (2006)  
Othman H. and Zeghal D. (2006) 
Razzaque R., Rahman M. and Salat A. 
(2006) 
Burghof H. and Johannsen M. (2006) 
Katz S. (2006) 
Maijoor S. and Vanstraelen A. (2006) 
DeDalt P., Jiraporn P. and Yaari V. (2006) 
Stubben S. (2006) 
Lei K. (2006) 
Hansen J. (2006) 
Jacob J. and Jorgensen B. (2007) 
Jo H. and Kim Y. (2007) 
Jaggi B. and Leung S. (2007) 
Koh P. (2007) 
Shuto A. (2007) 
Zhou J. (2008) 
Ahmed A. et al. (2008) 
Habib A. and Hossain M. (2008) 
Mora A. and Sabater A. (2008) 
Aussenegg W., Inwinkl P. and Schneider P. 
(2008) 
McNichols M. and Stubben S. (2008) 
Sivaramakrishnan K. and Yu S. (2008) 
Cohen D. and Zarowin P. (2008) 
Yu F. (2008) 
Sun J. and Liu G. (2009) 
Kao J., Wu D. and Yang Z. (2009) 
Duh R., Lee W. and Lin C. (2009) 
Chang J. and Sun H. (2009) 
Zhao Y. and Chen K. (2009) 
Jaggi B., Leung S., and Gul F. (2009) 
Cornett M., McNutt J. and Tehranian H. 
(2009) 
Chi J. and Gupta M. (2009) 
Tsai C. and Chiou Y. (2009) 
Yagüe J., Gómez-Sala J. and Poveda-
Fuentes F. (2009) 
Iatridis G. and Kadorinis G. (2009) 
Ittonen K., Peni E. and Vähämaa S. (2009) 
Callao S. and Jarne J.I. (2009) 
Adams B., Carow K. and Perry T. (2009) 
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Table 2. Evolution of investigation of earnings management (cont.)  
 
PANEL E: PAPERS BETWEEN 2006–2010 
Agarwal,S. et al. (2007) 
Byard D., Hossain M. and Mitra S. (2007) 
Arnedo L., Lizarraga F. and Sánchez S. 
(2007) 
Gill-de-Albornoz B. and Illueca M. (2007) 
Ye J. (2007) 
García Osma B. and Gill-de-Albornoz 
Noguer B. (2007) 
Geiger M., Quirvan C. and Hazera A. 
(2007) 
Cohen D., Dey A. and Lys T. (2007) 
Drautz A. (2007) 
Lee K., Lev B. and Yeo G. (2007) 
Hasnan S., Rahman R. and Mahenthiran S. 
(2007) 
Caramanis C. and Lennox C. (2008) 
Markarian G., Pozza L. and Prencipe A. 
(2008) 
Lo K. (2008) 
Cornett M., Marcus A. and Tehranian H. 
(2008) 
Jeanjean T. and Stolowy H. (2008) 
Siregar S. and Utama S. (2008) 
Aono J. and Guan L. (2008) 
Jiraporn P. et al. (2008) 
Chen X., Lee C. and Li J. (2008) 
Ahmad-Zaluki N. (2008) 
Jiraporn P., Sang Kim Y. and Mathur I. 
(2008) 
Rath S. and Sun L. (2008) 
Bukit R. and Iskandar T. (2009) 
Brau J. and Johnson P. (2009) 
Chung H., Sheu H. and Wang J. (2009) 
Charoenwong C. and Jiraporn P. (2009) 
García Osma B. and Guillamón-Saorín E. 
(2009) 
Shah S., Zafar N. and Durrani T. (2009) 
Sun L. and Rath S. (2009) 
Tylsch R. (2009) 
Liu Y., Ning Y. and Davidson W. (2009) 
Chen A.et al. (2010) 
Callao S. and Jarne J. (2010)  
Lo A., Wong R. and Firth M. (2010) 
Aharony J., Wang J. and Yuan H. (2010) 
Dechow P., Myers L. and Shakespeare C. 
(2010) 
Jiang J., Petroni K. and Wang I. (2010) 
ChenC. (2010) 
Dechow P. et al. (2010) 
Kempen R. (2010) 
Taylor G. and Xu R. (2010) 
Sun L. and Rath S. (2010) 
Matis D. et al. (2010) 
PANEL F: PAPERS BETWEEN 2011–2013 
Böching H. et al. (2011)  
Hadani M., Goranova A. and Khan R. 
(2011) 
Okamoto N. (2011)  
Nwaeze E. (2011) 
Callao S. and Jarne J. (2011) 
Zhang Y. (2012) 
Yero J. and Usman S. (2012) 
Cohen D., and Zarowin P. (2012) 
Ardison K., Martinez A. and Galdi F. (2012)  
Alhadab M., Clacher I. and Keasey K. 
(2013) 
Badolato P., Donelson D. and Ege M. 
(2013) 
Llukani T. (2013) 
*  Papers in bold are in our opinion important papers which influence the development of earnings man-
agement research and are explained in Table 3 and / or in the text. These papers were selected as they 
are commonly cited by other authors over the years. 
Source: the author. 
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Dechow et al. (1995) propose their own model and they evaluate the effectiveness 
of measuring earnings management on two alternative models, the model proposed by 
Jones (1991) and the model proposed by them, also called the modified Jones model. 
Since then, the authors focus not only on the motivations of manipulating earnings, 
but also on the correct application and measure the scope of manipulating earnings. It 
is an important change in the investigation of earnings management. 
The next studies improve the topic of earnings management within the methodol-
ogy as well as the way of measuring the non-discretionary part of accruals. Among 
the studies we mention are some of the most cited by authors. Holthausen et al. 
(1995) perform a study which extends the earnings management literature in several 
ways. First, by utilizing proprietary databases from two human resource consulting 
firms, they perform a study that uses actual bonus plan thresholds and actual bonus 
plan payments. They are also able to update the sample period, utilize more sophisti-
cated methods for measuring the discretionary component of accounting accruals, and 
look at „real” earnings management techniques such as expenditures for research and 
development initiatives. Holthausen et al. (1995) are also able to replicate most of 
Healy’s findings with their new data set. However, the authors do not find evidence 
supporting managers’ propensity to make income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
when they are below the bonus threshold. In discussing the results of their analysis, 
the authors note that the choice of discretionary accrual measures influences the re-
sults found.  
 
Table 3. Most important papers on earnings management  
 
Author and year Research topic and obtained results 
Healy (1985) Healy examines that executives rewarded by earnings-based bonuses 
select accounting procedures that increase their compensation. This 
paper analyses the format of typical bonus contracts, providing a more 
complete characterization of their accounting incentive effects than 
earlier studies. The test results suggest that accrual policies of manag-
ers are related to income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, 
and changes in accounting procedures by managers are associated with 
the adoption or modification of their bonus plan.  
Watts and Zim-
merman (1986) 
They analyse earnings-based compensation agreements. They confirm 
that accounting plays a significant role in the contractual relations that 
form the modern corporation, presumably to mitigate agency costs.  
DeAngelo (1986) She investigates the accounting decisions made by the managers of 
American Stock Exchange firms who proposed purchasing all public-
ly-held common stock and go private. These management buyouts 
engender potentially severe conflicts of interest for insider-managers. 
She finds that developed accrual methodology reveals no indication 
that managers of sample firms systematically understand earnings in 
periods before a management buyout of public stockholders.  
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Table 3. Most important papers on earnings management (cont.) 
 
Author and year Research topic and obtained results 
McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) 
They examine the discretionary and non-discretionary elements of bad 
debts provision. They explore the association between the abnormal 
expense and earnings given the incentives of managers who receive 
earnings-based bonuses to manage earnings through the bad-debt ex-
pense.  
Schipper (1989) Schipper proposes widely used definition of earnings management. He 
defines earnings management as a „purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some 
private gain”. In his study he investigates the asymmetry between 
a firm’s management and the firm’s shareholders.  
Jones (1991) She tests whether firms that would benefit from import relief (e.g., 
tariff increases and quota reductions) attempt to decrease earnings 
through earnings management during import relief investigations by 
the United States International Trade Commission (ITC). The study 
documents the use of accounting numbers in a federal government 
program as a basis for wealth transfers (i.e. import relief). For the first 
time, a new proxy for measuring earnings management is used. Her 




DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) investigate a sample of 94 firms that 
violated covenants and document that those firms exhibit an abnormal-
ly high level of total and working capital accruals during the year be-
fore and the year of violations.  
Dechow et al. 
(1995) 
They evaluate alternative models for detecting earnings management. 
They introduce some modification to the model developed by Jones 
(1991), and in effect exhibit the most power in detecting earnings man-
agement. Their result additionally highlights the importance of control-
ling for financial performance when investigating earnings manage-
ment. 
Holthausen et al. 
(1995) 
Using data of executive-specific short-term bonus plans, they investi-
gate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize 
the present value of bonus plan payments. They find evidence con-
sistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings down-
wards when their bonuses are at their maximum.  
Key (1997) He tests political costs theory by examining the cable television indus-
try during periods of Congressional scrutiny. Firms for which proposed 
regulations are expected to be more harmful have greater income-
decreasing accruals, and for some tests, firms for which cable televi-




They provide evidence that firms manage reported earnings to avoid 
earnings decreases and losses. Specifically, in cross-sectional distribu-
tions of earnings changes and earnings, they find unusually low fre-
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Author and year Research topic and obtained results 
quencies of small decreases in earnings and small losses, and unusually 
high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive 
incomes. They find evidence that two components of earnings, cash 
flow from operations and changes in working capital, are used to 
achieve increases in earnings.  
Teoh et al. (1998) They report that seasoned equity issuers can raise reported earnings by 
altering discretionary accounting accruals. They find that issuers who 
adjust discretionary current accruals to report higher net income prior 
to the offering have lower post-issue long-run abnormal stock returns 
and net income. Interestingly, the relation between discretionary cur-
rent accruals and future returns is stronger and more persistent for 
seasoned equity issuers than for non-issuers.  
Healy and Wah-
len (1998) 
They propose a widely used definition of earnings management. More-
over, they also conclude that to date the earnings management litera-
ture provided only modest insights for standard setters. Prior research 
focused almost exclusively on understanding whether earnings man-
agement exists and why. Their findings indicate that earnings man-
agement occurs for a variety of reasons, including influencing stock 
market perceptions, increasing management’s compensation, reducing 
the likelihood of violating lending agreements, and avoiding regulatory 
intervention.  
Kasznik (1999) He investigates the association between corporate voluntary disclosure 
and management’s discretion over accounting choices. In particular, he 
examines the role of earnings management in mitigating costs associat-
ed with management earnings forecast errors. The empirical results are 
consistent with the prediction that managers, fearing costly legal ac-
tions by shareholders and loss of reputation for credibility, used discre-
tionary accruals to reduce their forecasting errors. Specifically, the 
paper documents that managers who overestimate the earnings number 
manage reported earnings upward, and that the extent of discretionary 
accruals is associated with various securities litigation cost factors and 
the amount of management’s accounting flexibility. 
McNichols 
(2000) 
The author presents a new research design on earnings management: 
based on aggregate accruals, on specific accruals, and on the distribu-
tion of earnings management. A key theme of the paper is that empiri-
cal procedures for aggregate accruals studies lag behind both our theo-
ries of incentives to manage accruals and our institutional knowledge 
of how accruals behave. Empirical findings suggest that aggregate 
accruals models that do not consider long-term earnings growth are 
potentially misspecified and it could result in misleading inferences 
about earnings management behaviour.  
Peasnell et al. 
(2000) 
They examine specification and power issues in relation to cross-
sectional models used to estimate abnormal accruals. In addition to 
testing the standard-Jones (Jones, 1991) and modified-Jones (Dechow  
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Table 3. Most important papers on earnings management (cont.) 
 
Author and year Research topic and obtained results 
 et al., 1995) models, they develop and test additionally a new specifi-
cation, labelled the „margin model”. Empirical tests suggest that all 
three models are well specified when applied to a random sample of 
firm-years. However, they conclude that different models may be re-
quired in different circumstances. 
Klein (2002) The study of Klein examines whether audit committee and board char-
acteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. A negative 
relation is found between audit committee independence and abnormal 
accruals. A negative relation is also found between board independ-
ence and abnormal accruals. Reductions in board or audit committee 
independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accru-
als. In conclusion, these results suggest that boards structured to be 
more independent of CEO are more effective in monitoring the corpo-
rate financial accounting process. 
Xie et al. (2003) They examine the role of board of directors, the audit committee, and 
the executive committee in preventing earnings management. They 
show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit com-
mittee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will 
engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members 
with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that 
have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee 
meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretion-
ary current accruals.  
Leuz et al. (2003) They examine systematic differences in earnings management across 
31 countries. They propose an explanation for these differences based 
on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control 
benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from 
outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in inves-
tor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to ac-
quire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask 
firm performance. Their findings are consistent with this prediction 
and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the 




They examine the relation between the fees paid to auditors for audit 
and non-audit services and the choice of accrual measures for a large 
sample of firms. They find that the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
had a positive relation with the absolute value of accruals. They find 
additionally consistent evidence of a negative relation between the 
level of fees paid to auditors and accruals (i.e., higher fees are associat-
ed with smaller accruals).  
Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) 
They examine how capital market pressures and institutional structures 
shape firms’ incentives to report earnings that properly reflect their 
economic performance. They focus on level of earnings management 
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as one dimension of accounting quality that it is particularly responsive 
to firms’ reporting incentives. Their results document that raising capi-
tal in public markets and the quality of legal system are associated with 
the level of earnings management across European countries. They 
find that earnings management is more pervasive in private firms and 
that both public and private firms exhibit more earnings management 
in countries with weak legal enforcement. They document additionally 
that private and public firms respond differentially to differences in the 
tax and accounting rules in the EU. 
Roychowdhury 
(2006) 
She finds evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activi-
ties to avoid reporting annual losses. Specifically, she finds evidence 
suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduc-
tion to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary 
expenditures to improve reported margins. Cross-sectional analysis 
reveals that these activities are less prevalent in the presence of sophis-
ticated investors. Other factors that influenced real activities manipula-
tion include industry membership, the stock of inventories and receiv-
ables, and incentives to meet zero earnings.  
Ye (2007) Ye compares cross-sectional and time-series models. He shows that 
unexpected accruals based on the Jones and performance-adjusted 
Jones models by incorporating three measures from financial state-
ments: abnormal beginning non-cash working capital, working capital 
intensity, and historical depreciation rates evinced less bias and higher 
power in testing earnings management compared to those based on 
existing models. The proposed accruals model displays the advantages 
of both the cross-sectional and the time-series Jones models, but over-
comes their shortcomings. 
Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) 
They analyse the effect of mandatory introduction of IFRS standards 
on earnings quality, and more precisely on earnings management. They 
find that the pervasiveness of earnings management does not decline 
after the introduction of IFRS, and in fact increases in France. Their 
findings confirm that sharing rules is not a sufficient condition to cre-
ate a common business language, and that management incentive and 
national institutional factors play an important role in framing financial 
reporting characteristics.  
Callao and Jarne 
(2010) 
They focus on the effect of IFRS on earnings management. Their main 
purpose is to examine whether the adoption of IFRS in the European 
Union has increased or decreased the scope for discretionary account-
ing practices by comparing discretionary accruals in the periods pre-
ceding and immediately after the regulatory change. They determine 
additionally which firms’ features and country factors may explain the 
accounting discretion observed before and after IFRS. The results 
obtained show that earnings management has intensified since the 
adoption of IFRS in Europe, as discretionary accruals have increased in 
the period following implementation. The variables explaining  
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Table 3. Most important papers on earnings management (cont.) 
 
Author and year Research topic and obtained results 
 accounting discretion are the same before and after IFRS (business 
size, leverage, investor protection and legal enforcement). These re-
sults suggest that variations in earnings management might be due to 
some room for manipulation under international standards when com-
pared with local standards. 
Chen et al. 
(2010) 
The study shows private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in 
the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that 
sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing 
the shares of private issuing firms. They additionally find evidence 
showing that the reversal of effects of pre-issue earnings management 
is a significant determinant of long-term performance of private issues. 
Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating 
performance of firms using „aggressive” earnings management signifi-
cantly underperform those using more „conservative” earnings man-
agement.  
Source: the author. 
 
McNichols (2000) discusses trade-offs associated with three research designs 
commonly used in the earnings management literature: those based on aggregate ac-
cruals, those based on specific accruals and those based on distribution of earnings 
after management. A key theme of the paper is that empirical procedures for aggre-
gate accruals studies lag behind both our theories of incentives to manage accruals 
and our institutional knowledge of how accruals behave. Empirical findings suggest 
that aggregate accruals models that do not consider long-term earnings growth are 
potentially misspecified and can result in misleading inferences about earnings man-
agement behaviour.  
Yoon and Miller (2002) follow the line of investigation started by Dechow et al. in 
1995, where different models were used to find out the most powerful methodology 
to detect the earnings management issue. Yoon and Miller investigate the relationship 
between the operating performances of Korean industrial firms and the behaviour of 
discretionary accruals. They use four test methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation 
test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change test) to investigate if operating perfor-
mances affect discretionary accruals differently. Additionally, they compare three 
accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary accruals and total accruals) in test-
ing the earnings management hypotheses. They conclude that Korean industrial firms 
manage earnings.  
In the last 10–15 years we may observe studies which have been conditioned by 
significant corporate scandals (Enron, WorldCom, and Tico among others). Increas-
ingly, the discussion now focuses on how to prevent the manipulation of firms’ result. 
Klein (2002), for example, indicates the core importance of the audit committee. He 
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shows that an audit committee plays an important role in monitoring the company’s 
financial reporting process. Klein finds that audit committee independence is nega-
tively related to earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) examine the role of the board 
of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings 
management. They show that board and audit committee members with corporate or 
financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary cur-
rent accruals.  
Leuz et al. in 2003 investigate investor protection through international compari-
son across 31 countries. It is the first study which examined systematic differences in 
earnings management using such a wide ranging sample of countries. The analysis 
suggests that outsider economies with relatively dispersed ownership, strong investor 
protection and large stock markets exhibit lower levels of earnings management than 
insider countries with relatively concentrated ownership, weak investor protection and 
less developed stock markets (Leuz et al., 2003).  
In the following years, we may observe an effort to draw attention to the effect and 
impact of the introduction of the IFRS. Burgstahler et al. (2006) isolate the effects of 
reporting incentives (capital market pressure) and the effect of accounting standards, 
showing that the quality of the legal system is associated with the level of earnings 
management across European countries. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) also offer an 
investigation in the light of accounting norms, and their importance on the real image 
of the company. They analyse the effect of the mandatory introduction of IFRS stand-
ards on earnings management. They find that the pervasiveness of earnings manage-
ment does not decline after the introduction of IFRS, and in fact increases in France. 
Their findings confirm that sharing rules is not a sufficient condition to create a com-
mon business language, and those management incentives and national institutional 
factors play an important role in framing financial reporting characteristics.  
Callao and Jarne (2010) also examine whether the adoption of IFRS in the Euro-
pean Union has increased or decreased the scope for the discretionary accounting 
practices by the comparing accruals in the periods preceding and immediately after 
the regulatory change. In contrast to previous authors, they point out that earnings 
management increased after the adoption of IAS / IFRS standards. As to current dis-
cretionary accruals, they find a significant increase for France, Spain and the UK, and 
no significant changes (either for increase or for decrease) in other countries. With 
reference to long-term discretionary accruals, they find that all the changes are signif-
icant, but the number of firms in which they increase exceeds the number of firms in 
which they decreased.  
Finally, in the last three years, between 2011 and 2013, we may observe that in-
vestigations again focus on different incentives and factors which may influence earn-
ings management. Hadani et al. (2011) focus on information asymmetry between 
owners and managers, and the effect of shareholder activism and earnings manage-
ment. The results indicate that the number of shareholder proposals received by firms 
is positively related to subsequent earnings management. Okamoto (2011) points out 
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the problems which arise in disputes concerning corporate aggressive earnings man-
agement. He attempts to shed new light on the present debate over principles-based 
versus rules-based accounting standards and aggressive earnings management. His 
paper concludes by supporting principles-based accounting standards accompanied by 
true and fair override provisions.  
Alhadab et al. (2013) analyse the relationship between real and accrual earnings 
management activities and IPO failure risk. They present evidence that IPO firms 
manipulate earnings upward utilizing real and accrual earnings management around 
the IPO. They find additionally that IPO firms with higher levels of real and accrual 
earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability of IPO failure 
and lower survival rates in subsequent periods.  
After the review of over two hundred papers we can observe important develop-
ments over the years on the topic of earnings management. Earnings management is 
an issue which has been influenced by many factors and circumstances. Different 
topics on earnings management have been shown which are related to the present 
situation of the markets, such as why managers manage earnings, which factors may 
influence the managers’ decision to opt for earnings management, how effectively 
they measure the manipulation, or how the concept is defined. Finally, recent research 
shows there is still an interest in the topic. Earnings management is a question that 
still interests.  
 
 
4. Methodological perspective  
 
The success of any earnings management study critically depends on the precise meth-
odology used to measure it. For example, McNichols (2000) distinguishes three main 
research designs commonly used in the literature: aggregate accruals models, a specif-
ic accruals, and statistical properties of earnings. Those based on aggregate accruals 
attempt to identify discretionary accruals based on the relation between total accruals 
and hypothesized explanatory factors. See, for example, the papers of Healy (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986). They use total accruals and change in total accruals. Jones (1991) 
introduces a regression approach to control for nondiscretionary factors influencing 
accruals. These approaches are typically called aggregate accruals studies.  
A second approach in the literature is to model a specific accrual, as in McNich-
ols and Wilson (1988). These studies often focus on industry settings in which a sin-
gle accrual is sizable and requires substantial judgment, for example the papers of 
McNichols and Wilson (1988), Petroni (1992), and Beaver and Engel (1996). The 
third approach is to examine the statistical properties of earnings to identify behav-
iour that influences earnings, as developed, for example, by Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and DeGeorge et al. (1999). These studies focus on the behaviour of earnings 
around a specified benchmark, such as zero or a prior quarter’s earnings, to test 
whether the incidence of amounts above and below the benchmark are distributed 
smoothly, or reflect discontinuities due to the exercise of discretion, for example studies 
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such as: Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and DeGeorge et al. (1999). Our study inves-
tigates the first approach based on accruals1, it is important to make a precise isolation 
of managed accruals from the normal/unmanaged portion. In Table 4 the main models 
of measuring earnings management are presented.  
The literature starts with the simplest models, proposed by Healy (1985), who 
measured earnings management through simple comparison of mean total accruals 
(scaled by lagged total assets) between sample groups. Later, DeAngelo (1986) esti-
mates the firm’s nondiscretionary accruals from the previous period and he assumes 
that first order differences in accruals have an expected value of zero. In fact, the 
DeAngelo model is a variation of the Healy model where total accruals is only de-
pendent on last year's total accruals instead of an average of years in the estimation 
period. 
Possibly the main advance in measuring earnings management is provided by 
Jones (1991). Her model is still one of the most popular accrual estimation models in 
earnings management research. She relaxes the assumption that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant. She estimates nondiscretionary accruals as a regression which 
includes change in sales and the level of property, plant and equipment as explanatory 
variables. Later studies demonstrated and explained some limitations of the Jones 
model. For example, as Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) point out, an important limita-
tion of the Jones model’s time series formulation is the need for a long time-series of 
data to allow for an effective estimation of regression parameters, which excludes 
firms without a sufficient number of observations from the sample (survivorship bi-
as). Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) point out additionally that the 
Jones model is misspecified for firms which experience extreme performance. In 
practice, different models are appearing (which proceed in our study) to cope with 
these and other limitations of this model.  
 
Table 4. Models of measuring earnings management 
 












itTA   – Total Accruals in year t 
1itA   – Total Assets in year t – 1 
 n  – number of years in the estimation period 











TA   – Total Accruals in year t – 1 
2itA   – Total Assets in year t – 2 
                                                     
1 The methodology based on the accruals is widely and mainly used by the authors. The literature 
points out a wide range of advantages in terms of the ability in precise detection of earnings management.  
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Table 4. Models of measuring earnings management (cont.) 
 


























itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itH  – The error term 





















itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC'  – Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itH  – The error term 





























itAB  – Accrual balance in year t, which is: 
itititititit DEPCLCAOINVARAB   
itAR – Receivables 
itINV  – Inventory 
itCAO  – Current assets other than cash, receivables, and inventory 
itCL  – Current liabilities excluding taxes and current maturities of long-term 
debt 
itDEP  – Depreciation and amortization 
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itEXP  – Operating expenses in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itH  – The error term 


































itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itCFO – Cash flow from operations in year t 
itH  – The error term 





























itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itIA  – Gross intangible assets in year t 
itH  – The error term 















itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itSALE'  – Change in sales in year t 
itREC'  – Annual change in receivables in year t 
itH  – The error term 

































itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itCFO'  – Change in cash flow from operations in year t 
itH  – The error term 
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Table 4. Models of measuring earnings management (cont.) 
 
Variables 
itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC'  – Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itEXP'  – Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t 
itPAY'  – Change in payables accounts in year t 
1itNCASH  – Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t – 1 
itGPPEGRW  – A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itH  – The error term 

















































itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
 k – is a slope coefficient from regression itREC' on itREV'  
itREV'  – Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC'  – Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
1itTA  – Total Accruals in year t – 1  
1' itSALE  – Annual change in sales from current year (t) to next year (t+1) 
( ttt SALESALESALE /)1   
itH  – The error term 













































itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA  – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itSALE'  – Change in sales in year t 
itREC'  – Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itBM  – Book-to-market ratio in year t 
itCFO  – Cash flow from operations in year t 
itH  – The error term 
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itTA  – Total Accruals in year t  
1itA – Total Assets in year t – 1 
itSALE'  – Change in sales in year t 
itREC'  – Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  – Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
1itROA  – Return on assets in year t 
itH  – The error term 
Source: the author. 
 
The study of Dechow et al. (1995) is an important contribution to the methodolo-
gy of measuring earnings management. They modify the original Jones model (1991) 
to eliminate a conjectured tendency of the Jones model. They evaluate alternative 
accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. They additionally estimate 
the effect of a cross-sectional or time-series data base. This study initiates the process 
of generating more and more powerful models in detecting earnings management.  
In the following years, the authors base their methodology on the modified Jones 
model (1995). They make certain modifications trying to improve the reliability of 
measuring earnings management, as the Dechow et al. (1995) model has been criti-
cized, mainly because of the omission of relevant explanatory variables. It was addi-
tionally criticized because it shows a significant negative correlation between accruals 
and cash flows, suggesting that such a relationship should be included in the abnor-
mal accruals models.  
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), for example, propose that an accrual balance 
concept and an instrumental variable approach would avoid some of the problems, 
such as simultaneity, errors in variables or omitted variable problems. Jeter and 
Shivakumar (1999) show that the time-series Jones model is more powerful than the 
cross-sectional Jones model in detecting earnings management. By introducing the 
CFO (Cash flow from Operating activities) variable, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) 
acknowledge the existence of a non-linear relationship between accruals and CFO in 
cross-sectional data. They want to control it for the non-linear relationship between 
accruals and CFO.  
The primary contribution of the study of Bartov et al. (2001) is to demonstrate that 
the cross-sectional Jones model and cross-sectional Modified Jones model perform 
better than their time-series counterparts in detecting earnings management. These 
two cross sectional models have not been formally evaluated by prior research, and 
their use may offer certain advantages to investors and researchers over their time-
series counterparts.  
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On the other hand, Zhang (2002) evaluates a comprehensive list of metrics proposed 
for detecting earnings management. He points out that the difficulty in evaluating the 
power of metrics for detecting earnings management lies in the fact that earnings man-
agement is not directly observable. His results cast doubt on the abilities of accrual-
based models to catch „minor offences”, which, according to the empirical frequency 
documented in previous earnings management research, is likely to be the norm, ra-
ther than the exception of various forms of earnings management (Zhang, 2002).  
Kothari et al. (2005) examine the specification and power of tests based on per-
formance-matched discretionary accruals, and they make comparisons with tests us-
ing traditional discretionary accrual measures (e.g., the Jones and modified-Jones 
models). They want to improve the Jones model (1991) arguing that performance 
measures are important because of the potential momentum in the economic activities 
and earnings of firms. Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that researchers who do not use 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals „are likely to draw inferences that are 
unreliable at best and incorrect at worst”. Their results suggest that performance-
matched discretionary accrual measures enhance the reliability of inferences from 
earnings management research. It occurs because the hypothesis being tested does not 
imply that earnings management will vary with performance and the control firms are 
not expected to have engaged in earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Finally, we conclude with the study of Ye (2007) that expands the wide use of the 
Jones model and performance-adjusted Jones models by incorporating three measures 
from financial statements: abnormal beginning non-cash working capital, working 
capital intensity, and historical depreciation rates. He shows that unexpected accruals 
based on the proposed model demonstrate less bias and higher power in testing earn-
ings management compared to those based on existing models. Thus, to clarify, he 
focuses on how some basic characteristics of firms, measured in financial statements, 
affect accruals (Ye, 2007).  
Within the period of 2007–2013 the methodology is based on existing models. The 
authors in the majority of studies use the Dechow et al. model (1995), for example 
Cohen and Zarowin (2008), Yu (2008), Liu et al. (2009), Hadani et al. (2011), Nwaeze 
(2011), Yero and Usman (2012) among others. Other authors use the Jones model 
(1991), for example Naz et al. (2011), Zhang (2012) or Llukani (2013).  
Nevertheless, for example, Matis et al. (2010) use three models to measure discre-
tionary accruals: the Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) models. 
Ardison et al. (2012) also use three models of discretionary accruals as proxy for 
earnings management: the Jones model (1991), the modified Jones model (1995) and 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995). Therefore, nothing innovative was contributed to 
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5. Cross-country perspective  
 
Researchers deal with the need of the earnings management phenomenon to opt for 
the country of the sample selection. Sample selection is one of the key elements in any 
research. Mattessich (2008) points out that research on countries / geographical areas 
is a very useful research tool, especially for those engaged in comparative internation-
al research. It is additionally useful for those who wish to extend their knowledge 
about developments in countries. Mattessich (2008) adds that this type of work helps 
to illustrate the links between the ideas expounded in one country to those in another.  
For those reasons, the cross-country perspective on earnings management may be 
of special interest to investigators, as no study has been done to date. Other studies 
point out that the country of origin of the sample influences the perceptions and the 
results of earnings management investigations. Leuz et al. (2003), for example, state 
that earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of 
outside investors is weak, because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private 
control benefits and hence have stronger incentives to obfuscate firm performance. 
Geiger et al. (2006) provide evidence that national origin affects perceptions of earn-
ings management in countries in the English-speaking world and Europe.  
Other investigations present how firms exhibit more earnings management in 
countries with weak legal enforcement (Burgstahler et al., 2006). In this case, investi-
gators would expect that individuals from different countries would vary in their per-
ceptions of earnings management on these different situational factors. Following the 
study of Geiger et al. (2007) we would expect that companies from different countries 
would differ across their perceptions of earnings management. Therefore, Geiger et 
al. (2007) set different suppositions: earnings manipulations will differ across the 
countries; accounting rules-based earnings manipulations differ across the countries; 
operating decisions to manipulate earnings will differ across the countries; and final-
ly, the differences between accounting and operating manipulations will differ across 
the countries. It suggests that the choice of country for the study of earnings manage-
ment will determine the results and the perception of earnings management.  
We may observe in the above systematic research that authors are interested in in-
vestigating earnings management in different countries. However, there is surprisingly 
little space devoted to the country of origin. It is barely touched on in earnings man-
agement. This section comprises a very useful set of country of origin bibliographical 
references for earnings management investigators, which may provide a starting point 
for any reader who wishes to follow up any of the issues related to this topic, and 
select a sample.  
Furthermore, this work helps to illustrate the links between the results on the manip-
ulation of earnings in one country to those in another. This work also provides in-
sights for those interested in comparative studies between different countries. A coun-
try perspective may additionally provide source evidence for those who look for new 
and non-investigated markets in terms of the issue of earnings management.  
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Among the existing studies on earnings management we can observe:  
1. Studies based on a sample from one country. These investigations present the 
phenomenon of earnings management in one particular country. The authors de-
termine if earnings are manipulated or not in one particular country sample.  
2. Studies based on samples from two or three countries. These papers focus on the 
comparison of two or three origin samples. The authors detect the differences and 
similarities between countries. They try to establish connections, divergences, and 
/ or variations within two / three markets.  
3. Studies based on a set of countries (more than three). The authors indicate the gen-
eral tendencies in the investigation of earnings management among a different set 
of countries2.  
 
5.1. Investigations based on a sample from a single country  
 
Within the earnings management literature we can observe that a common practice of 
researchers is the use of a one-country selection sample. The authors in their study 
focus on one particular market. Normally it occurs in response to a special situation; 
for example the study of Byard et al. (2007). They examine earnings management 
using US-based oil companies in the period immediately after the impact of hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita. They show that large petroleum refining firms record signifi-
cant abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the fiscal quarter immediately after the 
impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
Aono and Guan (2008) examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on earnings 
management using publicly listed US companies between 2-year periods before and 
after 2002 when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act went into effect. The empirical results sug-
gest that indeed in the 2-year period prior to the Act, there is evidence of earnings 
management. The study of Chen et al. (2008) investigates the consequence of the 
introduction of a set of government regulations related to the quality of Chinese listed 
firms. It additionally shows the response of local governments to help listed firms in 
earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. The conclu-
sion suggests that the collusion between government and listed firms in earnings 
management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments.  
We may perceive that these studies are very detailed studies. They are centred 
on a special topic, with a high level of analysis, and they provide systematic results. 
One-country sample studies are the most appropriately viewed to investigate exhaust-
ively one aspect of earnings management within one market because they can be done 
accurately.  
                                                     
2 We do not match this group with the previous one for a substantial reason: the level of detail be-
tween the studies based on two or three sample countries and based on four or more countries are com-
pletely different. The latter studies only point out some of the convergences between the group of coun-
tries. In contrast, the studies of two or three countries evaluate in detail the differences and similarities 
between the countries. These research studies are much more detailed studies.  
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Within these studies we may find a wide range of papers from the US. The origin 
sample from the US is the most frequent selection in the literature on earnings man-
agement. We may observe that literature from North America starts in 1985 with the 
study of Healy, who first explored the topic of earnings management. Later, two stud-
ies must be highlighted in relation to the methodology applied by the authors: the 
study of Jones (1991) and the study of Dechow et al. (1995). Jones proposes a new 
model to measure the manipulation while the other study evaluates the different alter-
native accrual-based models.  
In the following years, the diversity and wide selection of topics should be noted, 
such as managing earnings to avoid report earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), 
testing the influence of political costs on earnings management (Key, 1997), the rela-
tionship between fees paid to auditors and the choices of accruals methods (Larcker 
and Richardson, 2004), the market’s efficiency in processing manipulated accounting 
reports (Louis, 2004), and agency costs of overvalued equity (Chi and Gupta, 2009) 
among others.  
Moreover, the sample selection differs substantially. There are studies based on 
small samples, for example the study of Byard et al. (2007) using 29 listed compa-
nies, the study of Jones (1991) based on 31 companies, or the study of Key (1997) 
employing 47 companies of the cable television industry. On the other hand, other 
authors use wide samples; see, for example Ye (2007) with 75,348 companies, or 
Burgstahles and Dichev (1997) who provide evidence from 64,466 companies.  
Europe is also a common source of samples for measuring earnings management. 
We can find studies which based their research on small samples rather than wide 
samples, for example Kasanen et al. (1996) using a sample of 37 companies from 
Finland; Markarian et al. (2008) with 130 Italian firms; or Yagüe et al. (2009) who 
based their study on only 45 Spanish companies.  
The topic of studies in Europe varies. Kallunki and Martikainen (1999) investigate 
the earnings management of Finnish industry firms, where accounting and tax legisla-
tion provide extensive possibilities for earnings management. Roosenbooma et al. 
(2003) provide evidence on the impact of earnings management on the long-run stock 
price performance of initial price offerings. Burghof and Johannsen (2006) examine 
whether market participants differently assess the information uncertainty associated 
with earnings management depending on the degree of income smoothing. Caramanis 
and Lennox (2008) test the effect of audit effort on earnings management.  
There is also extensive investigation studies based on samples from the Asian 
market, such as: China, Taiwan, Japan, etc. Studies from Asia vary in sample selec-
tion and in topics. We may observe studies which are based on an important scope 
sample, such as Kim and Yi (2005) using 63,386 firm-year observations; Yu et al. 
(2006) based their study on 5,921 Chinese companies; while Liu and Lu (2007) sam-
ple from 5,977 companies. On the other hand, for example, Rahman et al. (2005) used 
only 99 companies from Malaysia; Razzaque et al. (2006) sampled only 14 companies 
from Bangladesh; or Agarwal (2007) who studied 78 Japanese companies. 
162                                                                                      Susana Callao, José I. Jarne, David Wróblewski 
 
 
The topic of investigations also changes. Saleh et al. (2005) and Ali Shah et al. 
(2009) assess the effectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring earnings man-
agement. Johl et al. (2003) provide the evidence regarding audit quality and the level 
of earnings management. Lo et al. (2010) investigate if good governance help con-
strain management’s opportunistic behaviours. Lin (2006) investigates whether for-
eign investment enterprises in China alter their corporate reporting behaviour. Yu et 
al. (2006) examine whether Chinese firms manipulate their earnings to meet the regu-
latory requirements. Jaggi et al. (2009) investigate family control and its influence on 
earnings management (among other topics).  
The studies from Canada and Latin America are focused on the effect of board 
composition on the practice of earnings management in Canada (Park and Shin, 
2004); the evidence of Brazilian public companies as a response to capital market 
incentives of earnings management practice (Martinez, 2005); the investigation of the 
quality of financial accounting reports and earnings management (Feres de Almeida 
et al., 2005); or the study of the impact of US GAAP on the earnings management 
practices of Brazilian firms (Lopes et al., 2006).  
Moreover, there are only two studies from Australia3. These papers focus on the 
association between institutional ownership and Australian firms’ aggressive earnings 
management strategies (Koh, 2003). The second study examines whether managers 
manage earnings to „just meet or beat” analysts’ forecasts in Australia (Habib and 
Hossain, 2008). Both studies base their samples on a small number of companies, 836 
and 738, respectively. 
In conclusion, within the studies of earnings management based on single-country 
sample, we may notice the intensification of investigation of earnings management 
from North America almost 60% of all studies (99 studies from the US and one study 
from Canada) on earnings management4. We also observe a significant number of 
studies from Asia – 39 studies, which is 22% of the total studies. We see a relatively 
small number of studies from Europe, only 33. Taking into consideration that Europe 
is almost always a leading continent in investigation, this number of studies is rather 
poor (see Figure 1). We also observe two studies from Australia and four from South 







                                                     
3 We analyze studies till September of 2013.  
4 We do not include multi-country studies. In our statistics we took into consideration those studies with 
a sample from one country. We have investigated 207 studies; however, of these there are 14 theoretical 
studies without a sample, and 17 studies with a multi-country sample. In this way we have 176 studies.  
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Source: the author. 
 
5.2. Investigations based on a sample from two or three countries:  
comparative studies  
 
We separate these studies based on two / three country samples from the studies based 
on multi-country samples (sample from more than three countries). Ragin (1994) 
explains that comparative researchers examine patterns of similarities and differences 
across a moderate number of cases. Therefore, a typical comparative study has a hand-
ful of cases / samples. The number of cases is limited because one of the concerns of 
comparative research is to establish familiarity with the particular case included in the 
study (Ragin, 1994). It is typically used when researchers have substantial knowledge 
of a particular case included in an investigation and there are a relatively small num-
ber of such cases, as mentioned. The best way to grasp the essential features of the 
comparative method is to examine it in the light of contrasts.  
On the other hand, the studies based on multi-country samples try to find a com-
mon pattern between all the samples (which we present in the next section). These 
studies are less detailed and they are focused on the exploration of general character-
istics within all the samples rather than the evaluation of the details of a particular 
sample market. Multi-country studies are additionally oriented to explore a narrow 
number of characteristics within all the samples and to contrast the situation for all the 
countries. These studies are helpful in terms of evaluating the wide range of countries 
and perceiving general tendencies. However, within the inconvenience, we mention 
that it is impossible to explore all the samples in the same detail as in the comparative 
studies. In these circumstances, we separate these two types of studies.  
In the literature of earnings management we do not find many comparison studies. 
In other words, there are few papers based on a sample from two or three sample 
countries. Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) examine earnings management using very 
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large samples of 17,394 companies from: France, Germany and the UK (3,904; 4,067; 
9,423, respectively). They focus on audit quality in international capital markets. 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) use only samples from France and Canada (1,674 French 
and 1,470 Canadian companies). They investigate factors that potentially influence 
earnings-management policy with reference to the Anglo-American and Euro-Conti-
nental accounting models.  
Drautz (2007) uses the sample from Germany and the UK (63 companies from 
Germany and 112 from UK) to clarify the question of earnings management as a func-
tion of the national audit environment. Tylsch (2008) presents a study on three coun-
tries: Germany, Japan and the USA (Germany 735 companies, Japan 720 and USA 
675). He provides empirical evidence on the differences in the extent of earnings 
management across those countries. He confirms a possible link between the real 
economic performance of a country and the extent of earnings management.  
Another study, of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), uses a sample of Australian, French 
and UK companies (422, 321 and 403 companies, respectively) to analyse the effect 
of the mandatory introduction of IFRS standards on earnings management. Ittonen et 
al. (2009) analyse companies from Finland and Sweden to demonstrate the associa-
tion between earnings management and the gender of audit engagement partner.  
 
Figure 2. Number of studies on two / three country samples  
 
 
Source: the author. 
 
Figure 2 shows comparative studies over time. The first study is from 2006. It 
suggests that investigators in the last five years are focusing on the comparative stud-
ies of two or three countries to demonstrate some aspects of earnings management, 
such as influence of audit control on earnings management, the effect of national 
origin on earnings management, or analysis of the effect of the mandatory introduc-
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5.3. Investigations based on a sample from more than three countries:  
panel studies  
 
Studies across countries (panel samples) have important implications for earnings 
management investigations. These country cluster analyses contribute to the literature 
by signalising and determining the differences among a wide number of countries 
related to the earnings management phenomenon. To mention some of the studies, 
Leuz et al. (2003) examine the systematic differences in earnings management across 
31 countries while Burgstahler et al. (2004) present how capital market pressures and 
institutional structures shape firms’ incentives to report earnings that properly reflect 
their economic performance 13 countries.  
Coppens and Peek (2005) address the questions of whether private firms in eight 
European countries engage in earnings management and, if so, whether tax incentives 
affect such practices. Geiger et al. (2006) demonstrate that national culture influences 
perceptions of acceptability of earnings management. They do the research based on 
a sample from 8 countries. And finally, Callao and Jarne (2010) focused on the effect 
of IFRS on earnings management from 11 countries.  
We may observe again that there are only a few studies, mentioned above, related 
to the exploration of earnings management using multiple country samples (see Figure 
3). Only 6% of all investigations are based on multi-country sample. Also, a very low 
percentage of studies (10%) is from the two / three country samples. In addition, we 
may observe that studies based on a sample from one country represent the majority 
of studies on earnings management. 169 studies from the total of 185 papers of earn-
ings management construct a data using a unique country sample, which is 92% of all 
studies from earnings management within our period of investigation (1985 to 2013).  
 
Figure 3. Number of studies divided into breadth of study sample  
 
 
*  We have investigated a total of 207 papers. There are 14 theoretical studies without sample study, so 
because of this our statistics include 193 papers. 
Source: the author.  
92%
5% 3%
A sample from one country A sample from two or three countries
A sample from more than three countries
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Finally, Figure 4 presents the investigations made over the time of all investiga-
tions on earnings management (all three groups). We may observe that in the first 10 
years of investigation of earnings management there are a few papers, only 9% of all 
the studies. In the next five years, there is a pretty large increase in the investigations 
on earnings management: a total of 39 studies, which is 19% of all papers. In the pe-
riod of 2001–2005 the investigation continues to increase significantly, with a total of 
50 studies.  
 
Figure 4. Percentage of studies over the time  
 
 
Source: the author.  
 
And finally, we observe the intensification of research on earnings management in 
the last 5–6 years. In the period of 2006–2010 there are 90 studies. In the period of 





In this paper we discussed and reviewed the developments on the issue on earnings 
management from three main perspectives: chronological, methodological and a cross-
country perspective. We did a systematic analysis of a total of 207 papers. In the 
chronological perspective, we can observe that the major intensification of studies is 
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between 2006 and 2010. Moreover, in the previous five years (2001–2005) the ten-
dency on improvement on research on earnings management was also observed.  
Furthermore, earnings management is an issue which has been influenced by 
many factors and circumstances. Different topics on earnings management have been 
shown related to the present situation of the markets. In the first years of research, the 
authors focused their investigations on the motivations for earnings management. The 
main question considered was: why do managers manage earnings. During other pe-
riods, authors focused attention on how earnings management is detected. They de-
veloped different models on measuring earnings management. Finally, in the last 
period, they opted for finding a response to the special difficulties which appeared, 
such as corporate financial scandals. All these investigations lead to underlining the 
importance of reporting information and the strong demand for quality information.  
We additionally discussed and analysed the methodological perspective: This per-
spective is related to the use of different models to detect earnings management. 
Within the existent models we highlight the importance of the Jones model (1991) 
and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). These two models are still wide-
ly used by authors. However, a wide range of modifications to the Dechow et al. 
(1995) model have been done over time. Authors increasingly tried to use other met-
rics for measuring the discretionary part of accruals. We pointed out the important 
limitations of the different models to help future researchers opt for the most appro-
priate model for their particular research environment, as the „perfect” model for 
measuring earnings management does not exist.  
Finally, we developed a country perspective on the sample selection. The country 
analysis is a new perspective presented in our paper. This section comprises a very 
useful set of country of origin bibliographical references for earnings management 
investigators. It helps to illustrate the link between the results on the manipulation of 
earnings in one country to those in another. It shows additionally insights for future 
studies such as: where earnings management has still not been explored.  
We observed that earnings management was investigated in the majority of stud-
ies. We would like to stress the wide range of the US samples. Within the total of 207 
papers analysed, 99 studies are from the US. Europe is also a common source of sam-
ples to measure earnings management. European samples were used in 33 studies, 
which puts it in third place (related to continents) in the investigation of earnings 
management (Asia occupies second place with 39 studies on this topic). Comparative 
studies (samples based on two or three countries) come much later, the first study 
appearing in 2006. It suggests that investigators in the last five years are focusing on 
the comparative studies of two or three countries to demonstrate some aspects of 
earnings management.  
Finally, panel studies (multi-country studies) make up a very small number of the 
total studies. Although they have important implications for the earnings management 
investigation, as they signalise and determine the differences related to the earnings 
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management phenomenon from among a large number of countries, they represented 
only 6% of all the investigations on earnings management.  
Taking all these debates and fields of research into consideration we may still ob-
serve possible lines of investigations. For example, it could be interesting to investi-
gate and deepen the question related to the models in detecting earnings management. 
There are a number of methodological problems associated with how accruals and, 
more precisely, the discretionary part of accruals are measured. As a result, there is 
a substantial amount of research that discusses those problems in detail, or proposes 
new approaches to making better accrual estimations (for example, see studies of 
McNichols and Wilson 1988; Dechow et al., 1995; McNichols 2000, Fields et al., 
2001; Kothari et al., 2005). Some attempts at measuring the reliability of earnings 
models were done in the earnings management literature. However, there is no con-
sensus regarding which model is more reliable.  
A potentially fruitful alternative may be to analyse financial statements in more 
detail, much as analysts do, in the hope of uncovering more convincing evidence 
about how and why managers exercise their accounting discretion.  
Another interesting topic on earnings management can be the motivations and fac-
tors which influence the scope of manipulating earnings. Such investigations have 
been done in detail in Western European countries or the US, however, some new 
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The objective of this paper is to review academic evidence on earnings management over the last twenty 
five years in order to help academic researchers, regulators and investors understand better the issues 
surrounding earnings management. The paper will be of special interest to investigators just starting to 
research this topic as we conduct an extensive literature review on earnings management from three 
different perspectives: a chronological perspective, in which we present the roadmap of the evolution of 
the earnings management literature in chronological order showing the main developments through the 
years; a methodological perspective, focusing on the different ways of detecting and measuring earnings 
management and respective improvements in the models; and a cross-country perspective, presenting the 
country of origin of the sample used by the authors. The last perspective might be of special interest to 
authors, as previous studies do not explore this perspective in detail.  
 




Rozwój literatury na temat zarządzania zyskiem. Przegląd tematyki z trzech różnych perspektyw  
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przegląd literatury naukowej na temat zarządzania zyskiem (earnings mana-
gement). Staramy się zaprezentować postępy w świetle prawie dwudziestu pięciu lat badania, i w efekcie 
pomóc autorom lepiej zrozumieć pojęcie i zagadnienia związane z zarządzaniem zyskiem. Artykuł będzie 
przedmiotem szczególnego zainteresowania autorów, którzy właśnie rozpoczynają prace i badania na ten 
temat, jako, że prezentujemy wszechstronną analizę tematu z trzech różnych perspektyw: chronologicznej, 
w której prezentujemy ewolucję koncepcji zarządzania zyskiem w czasie i pokazujemy najważniejsze 
postępy w temacie; metodologicznej, która ukazuje problematykę pomiaru zarządzaniem zyskiem; i geogra-
ficznej, która analizuje zjawisko kształtowania zysków w praktyce gospodarczej różnych krajów. Ostat-
nia perspektywa może być szczególnie istotna, jako że wcześniejsze badania nie traktowały szczegółowo 
tę perspektywę.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: zarządzanie zyskiem, rachunkowość, manipulacja, przegląd literatury, perspektywa geo-
graficzna.  
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